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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
JEANNETTE U, SWAN, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
DR. ROBERT H. LAMB and 
DR. DENNIS D. THOEN, 
STATE OF UTAH 
Defendants and 
Respondents. 
Case No. 14823 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Respondents respectfully petition this Court for a rehear-
ing of the above-entitled matter pursuant to Rule 76(e) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE 
This was an appeal from the Salt Lake District Court based 
upon the failure of the trial court to allow the testimony of 
an out-of-state expert who failed to qualify as being familiar 
with Salt Lake community medical standards. 
On August 16, 1978 this court reversed the trial court's 
decision and ordered a new trial. This Court held that a new 
"similar community" standard of care should be adopted in Utah 
and overruled the previous "strict locality" standard. 
-1-
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON REHEARING 
Respondents respectfully request that a rehearing be held 
solely as to the issue of whether this Court's decision should 
be applied retroactively or prospectively. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The only pertinent facts relevant to this rehearing are 
as follows: First, the alleged malpractice occurred in 1973. 
Second, the trial in this matter occurred in September of 1976, 
Finally, at both the time of the alleged malpractice and at the 
time of trial the "strict locality" standard, formulated by 
this Court in numerous decisions beginning from the time of 
statehood, was in effect. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
IT IS MANIFESTLY UNJUST TO APPLY THE NEW 
"SIMILAR LOCALITY" STANDARD TO THE DEFEN-
DANTS IN THIS CASE AND TO ANY OTHER PAR-
TIES RETROACTIVELY BECAUSE THIS COURT'S 
DECISION CHANGES A STANDARD OF CARE UPON 
WHICH THESE DEFENDANTS, DEFENDANTS IN OTHER 
PENDING LAWSUITS, AND DOCTORS NOT YET SUED 
HAVE BEEN ENTITLED TO RELY UPON. 
A state in defining the limits of adherence to precedent 
may make a choice for itself between the principle of forward 
operation and that of relation backward. It may say that deci-
sions of its highest court, though later overruled, are law 
nonetheless for intermediate transactions. The choice for any 
. d-
sta te may be determined by the juristic philosophy of the JU 
-2- l 
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ges of her courts, their conceptions of law, its origin and 
nature. Great Northern Railway Company v. Sunburst Oil and 
Refining Company, 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932). 
It is generally accepted that an appellate court, upon 
overruling a previous decision, has three choices as to how 
the overruling decision should be applied: First, the over-
ruling decision can be given a purely prospective application 
where the new law declared will not even apply to the parties 
to the overruling case; second, the decision can be given a 
limited retroactive effect where the law declared will govern 
the rights of the parties to the overruling case but in all 
other cases will be applied prospectively; and finally, the 
decision can be given general retroactive effect where the 
law declared will govern the rights of the parties to the over-
ruling case but in all other cases will be applied prospec-
tively. See generally, Ann., "Prospective or Retroactive Opera-
tion of Overruling Decisions", 10 A.L.R.3d 1371-1447. 
In deciding the effect an overruling decision should be 
given it is recognized that three separate factors should be 
considered: 
[T]he decision "must establish a new princi-
ple of law, even by overruling clear past pre-
cedent in which litigants may have relied, or 
-3-
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by deciding an issue of first impression 
whose resolution was not clearly f oresha-
dowed". Second, we must evaluate the merit 
of retroactive or prospective application 
of the rule in light of prior history, pur-
pose and effect. Third, we must weight the 
hardship and injustice of applying the rule 
to the litigants in the instant case. Moore 
v. State, 553 P.2d 828 (Alaska 1976). (Emphasis added). 
See also State Farm Mutual Insurance Company v. Farmer's In-
surance Exchange, 493 P.2d 1002 (Utah 1972); State v. stenrud, 
553 P.2d 1201 (Ariz. 1976); In Re Bye, 524 P.2d 854 (Cal. 1974); 
Russell v. Blackwell, 492 P.2d 953 (Haw. 1972); and Wood v. 
Morris, 554 P.2d 1032 (Wash. 1976). 
In applying these standards to the case at bar, it can 
readily be seen that substantial justice will be served only 
by the prospective application of this Court's decision. 
First, there can be no doubt that this Court's decision 
established a new principle of law in that it overruled the 
medical malpractice standard which has been utilized in the 
State of Utah since its statehood. It is elementary that proof 
of a standard of skill required of a physician is essential for 
a plaintiff to prevail in a malpractice action. The standard 
establishes the duty owed by the physician to the patient and 
thus is an essential element of a plaintiff's case. 
Second, the prior history, purpose, and effect of the 
strict locality rule was to provide a workable standard for the 
medical community by requiring each practitioner to be as com-
petent as other practitioners in the same community. 
This rule 
-4-
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1 
protected a physician from meeting a higher standard found in 
other communities which may have resulted from better medical 
facilities and opportunities for training. It protected the 
physician from being subjected to a standard which he could 
not meet under the circumstances existing at that time. Like-
wise, the patient only had to prove that the physician breached 
a standard held within the same community regardless of whether 
it was higher or lower than surrounding communities. 
Third, it is obvious that retroactive application of this 
Court's decision in the instant case will cause great hardship 
and injustice not only to defendants in this instant case put 
to all physicians who have practiced up until the date of this 
Court's decision. 
The standard to be applied in a malpractice case should be 
at the time the malpractice occurred--not in retrospect at the 
time of trial. In Brown v. Colm, 522 P.2d 688 (Cal. 1974) a 
suit was commenced in 1968 alleging malpractice in 1949. The 
court in that case held it was error to exclude the testimony 
of an expert witness who was not personally acquainted with the 
medical standard in the year 1949 but who had studied the stan-
dard which existed at that time in a similar community. The 
court, in reversing the lower court decision, stated that it was 
essential for the plaintiff to, prove the standard existing ~ 
the time of the alleged malpractice in order to determine what 
degree of skill, knowledge and care was required by the physician 
-s-
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at the time of the occurrence. 
Section 78-14-4, U.C.A. provides as follows: 
No malpractice action against a health 
care provider may be brought unless it is 
commenced within two years after the plain-
tiff or patient discovers, or through the 
use of reasonable diligence should have 
discovered the injury, whichever first oc-
curs, but not to exceed four years after 
the date of the alleged act, omission, ne-
glect, or occurrence, except that: (In 
an action where a foreign object has been 
left in the body the claim must be commen-
ced within one year after the patient dis-
covers or should have discovered it) and 
(if a patient has been prevented from dis-
covering misconduct by fraud it must be 
brought within one year after the patient 
discovers or should have discovered the 
fraudulent concealment) • 
Thus, under the Statute of Limitations physicians can be 
liable for a period of two-to-four years after the occurrence 
giving rise to the alleged malpractice and in certain instances 
can be liable for many years beyond that period if the patient 
fails to discover a foreign object or a fraudulent concealment. 
A retroactive application of this Court's decision sub-
stantially affects three classifications of physicians: first, 
it affects the defendants in the instant case who performed the 
surgery in 1973; second, it affects those physicians who were 
sued prior to this Court's decision in the instant case but who 
had not yet had a final judgment; and finally, it affects those 
physicians who may be sued in the future for alleged malprac-
tice events which occurred prior to this Court's decision. 
-6-
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In each instance, the physicians in question relied upon 
the local community standard as the duty owed to their patients 
at the time the alleged malpractices occurred. As pointed out 
extensively in respondents' brief in chief there are numerous 
differences in opinions concerning a variety of medical opera-
tions and procedures and a physician is under a much greater 
liability if he is subjected to a "similar community standard" 
in which the practice or procedure is not accepted in the com-
munity in which he practices. It cannot be assumed, for exam-
ple, that one procedure used to remove a kidney is of lesser 
quality than a different procedure used by doctors in another 
community. However, a physician knowing that he may have to 
justify his procedure as compared with the other will have to 
more carefully evaluate which procedure is most generally ac-
cepted in "similar communities" if he is to avoid groundless 
lawsuits. 
If a physician is to be judged by a similar community stan-
dard then it is only equitable that he knows this at the time 
he is performing the medical care so that he has the choice of 
deciding whether to undertake a given procedure or whether such 
procedure may be too controversial or unproven in light of dif-
fering community standards. 
Respondents submit, therefore, that this Court's decision 
should be given a strict prospective application including the 
Plaintiff in the instant case since defendants at the time of 
-7-
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the operation relied upon the local community standard which 
had existed in this state for over 100 years. 
And while it is commendable for a plaintiff to seek change 
in an existing rule of law this benefit must not be outweighed 
by the reliance and injustice which will occur to the defendant. 
As stated by one authority concerning this problem of retro-
active application of a decision and its effect upon the plain-
tiff and defendant: 
[I]nsofar as the need for incentive to have 
outmoded or unjust rules overturned is con-
cerned, it may be urged that if a party who 
seeks to have an old rule overturned has rea-
son to believe that he can show that reliance 
interests are not justifiable or sufficiently 
strong, he has adequate incentive to request 
the overruling of the earlier case in such a 
manner that the overruling decision can be 
applied retroactively not only to the parties 
similarly situated, for example, to others who 
have commenced or are about to commence liti-
gation~ but it would appear only fair that 
the party seeking to have an old rule over-
turned must take the risk that if the oppos-
ing party had strong and justifiable reliance 
interests which are entitled to protection, the 
overruling decision will be given prospective 
effect only, so as not to apply in the over-
ruling case itself. (Emphasis added). Annot., 
10 A.L.R.3d 1971, 1380. 
In cases such as this where a long established standard 
has been abruptly overturned there must necessarily be severe 
hardship and injustice which require prospective application of 
the decision. Cascade Security Bank v. Butler, 567 P.2d G3l 
(Wash. 1977). 
-a-
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POINT II 
THE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THIS COURT'S 
DECISION OVERRULING THE "STRICT LOCALITY 
RULE" IS CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLES ENUN-
CIATED IN PREVIOUS DECISIONS OF THIS COURT. 
This Court in numerous decisions has consistently held 
that rights, duties, and privileges should generally be changed 
only by the legislature or in rare instances by this Court but 
that in every case fair notice must be given to those who relied 
upon the previous law. 
In Rubalcava v. Gissman, 384 P.2d 389 (1963) this Court 
held that a wife could not maintain a tort action against-her 
husband or his estate. Justice Crockett in stating why the rule 
should not be modified stated the following: 
It has always been the law of our state, 
insofar as we have been able to ascertain, 
that a suit of this character could not be 
maintained. It is inevitable that this has 
been assumed to be the law and has been de-
pended upon in the formation of existing 
contracts. We are of the opinion that under 
these circumstances, in fairness to those 
who have relied thereon, and in proper de-
ference to the solidarity of the law, any 
change could be justified only to correct 
patent error, (Footnote citing Great Nor-
thern Railway Co. v. Sunburst Oil Company 
as allowing prospective effect of decisions) 
otherwise it should be made by the legis-
lature, plainly so declaring, so that all 
may be advised what the change is and when 
it will be effective. Id. at 393. 
In Williams v. Utah State Department of Finance, 464 P.2d 
59 6 (Utah 1970) this court held that a prior decision overruling 
~stablished law concerning the right to attorney's fees would 
-9-
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not be applied retroactively and that the Court would not in-
dulge in the fiction that the previous controlling law never 
existed. ~also Draper v. Traveler's Insurance Co., 429 
F.2d 434 (10th Cir. 1970) (Applying Utah law prospectively). 
In State Farm Mutual Insurance Company v. Farmer's In-
surance Exchange, 493 P.2d 1002 (Utah 1972) this Court de-
clined to apply an overruled decision prospectively on the ba-
sis that there was no showing "that any considerable number of 
persons or corporations will be affected by letting the deci-
sion apply retroactively." The Court also stated "There is no 
showing that injustice would result or that administration of 
justice would in any way be affected." Id. at 1003. In this 
case, however, there is obviously a large number of persons 
affected by the change in standard which will result in great 
injustice and will severely restrict the administration of 
justice. 
In Brunyer v. Salt Lake County, 551 P.2d 521 (Utah 1976) 
this Court declined to apply retroactively Section 78-27-39, 
u.c.A. which allowed for the contribution of joint tort feasors. 
This Court stated: "The contribution statute established a 
primary right and duty which was not in existence at the time 
the injuries in this case arose." Id. at 542. The "duty" in 
a medical malpractice case is dependent upon the standard util-
ized by the plaintiff and such duties will necessarily arise 
d . h t tes where no from comparisons of medical standar in ot er s a 
-10- I 
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such duties existed under local standards. 
In Stanton v. Stanton, 564 P.2d 303 (1977), as supplemented, 
567 P.2d 625 (1977) Justice Crockett stated the reasoning of 
this Court as to why the lower court's decision raising the mi-
nority age of females from 18 to 21 was erroneous as to a di-
vorce decree which had been entered many years before. Justice 
Crockett stated the following: 
I reiterate with the firmest possible con-
viction that in my judgment it would be whol-
ly discordant to principles of equity and 
justice to impose such an unexpected and un-
planned for burden upon the defendant by an 
ex post facto change of the rules after the 
entry of the decree. Id. at 305. 
Finally, in this Court's recent decision of State v. Kel-
bach, 565 P.2d 700 (1977) this Court stated in great detail 
the purpose of applying overruled decisions prospectively: 
Justice Crockett wrote: 
As a general proposition the law as esta-
blished should remain so until change by the 
legislature, whose prerogative it is to make 
and change the law. This does not mean to 
say that where there is judge-made law which 
is later observed to be clearly in error, 
that such error should be so set in cement 
that it cannot be remedied. In such circum-
stances the court undoubtedly can and should 
correct it. 
That more important than any of the above is 
the oft proclaimed salutary principle: that 
ours is a government of laws and not of men. 
Accordingly, the law should not be changed 
simply because of the will or desire of jud-
ges as to what the law is or ought to be. 
Much less so, should it be so changed during 
-11-
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the course of a particular proceeding to 
have a retroactive effect thereon. Notwith-
standing the fact that the change the state 
advocates would vindicate the position taken 
in the dissent referred to, to so hold in 
this case retroactively would violate what 
we regard as a higher principle: that of 
honoring the established law. If there is 
to be such a change in the law, whether by 
legislative act or by judicial decision, it 
seems that it should have only prospective 
effect and that fairness and good conscience 
requires that it should not be applied retro-
actively to adversely affect rights as they 
existed at the time the particular contro-
versy arose. (Citation to Great Northern 
Railway Co. v. Sunburst Oil Company). Id. 
at 702. 
This long line of cases clearly shows this Court's concern 
that the law be a reliable monument upon which a party can rely·· 
not a shifting mound of sand. If the law is to be changed it 
should only be done after notice of such change has been given 
to all concerned and not, as Justice Crockett stated in the~-
ton opinion, after the ballgame has already begun. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision in the instant case is an extremely important 
one not only to the present litigants but to hundreds of liti-
gants in the future years. It establishes what standard will be 
used to judge physicians in this state and presumably can logi· 
cally be extended to all professionals. 
The change to the "similar locality rule" is a drastic one 
in that it overrules a standard which has existed for over lOO 
years. It is unjust to apply this new standard with all of 
-12- J. Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
its consequences and ramifications to these defendants and to 
other physicians who in good faith attempted to meet the local 
conununity standard existing at the time the alleged malprac-
tic es occurred. 
such unfairness affects the defendants in the instant case, 
all the physicians presently in litigation, and all future phy-
sicians or professionals whose actions occurred prior to this 
Court's decision. 
For these reasons, respondents respectfully request that 
a rehearing be granted as to the issue of prospective applica-
tion of this Court's decision in order that this important and 
far-reaching aspect of the case may be fully argued by the par-
ties. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON, RUSSON, HANSON & DUNN 
spondent Dr. Thoen 
702 Kearns Bui ding 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
CHRISTENSEN, GARDINER, JENSEN & 
EVANS 
/. 
RAY CHRISTENSEN 
Attorney for Respondent Dr. Lamb 
900 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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